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Non–technical summary
This paper presents microeconometric evidence on financing difficulties of
research and development activities. In comparison to existing studies for
Germany, there are basically three new features in this paper: first, this
study focuses on small and medium–sized enterprises with 500 employees at
most (SME) while other authors have used samples of larger firms. Second,
previous studies are conditional on R&D–performing firms and neglect the
circumstance that a large share of smaller firms do not conduct any R&D
activities due to the lack of financial resources. In this case, non–R&D–
performing firms, and the endogeneity of their decision, are explicitly taken
into account. Third, special attention is paid to a comparison of Eastern
and Western Germany, and to the public R&D funding already provided
by government in both regions. In Eastern Germany, R&D activities are
extensively subsidized in order to accelerate the transformation process
from a planned economy to a market economy. It is questionable whether
these governmental actions alleviate financial constraints significantly.
In the empirical section of the paper, censored regression models are
estimated. It turns out that it is important to take non–R&D performing
firms into account when SME are considered. Firms may be completely
deterred from R&D by the lack of capital instead of just spending less
but a positive amount for R&D. Western German SME are financially
constrained in their R&D activities by both internal and external re-
sources. Another important factor in explaining different levels of R&D
expenditures are public R&D subsidies. Publicly funded firms exhibit
higher R&D expenditures than other firms. In Eastern Germany, no
external financial constraints for R&D are present. The results suggest
that R&D in Eastern Germany is to a large extent driven by public
subsidies since the German re–unification in 1990 and that the usual fi-
nancial market mechanisms are repealed with respect to R&D in this region.
Although the estimation results show that public funding is the driving force
for R&D in Eastern Germany, one may question whether the high level of
public R&D funding leads to a corresponding innovation success in terms of
market shares and sales of new products in many of these publicly funded
firms.
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Abstract
This paper presents microeconometric evidence on financing con-
traints for research and development activities in German small and
medium–sized firms (SME). Special attention is paid to the role of
public R&D subsidies. For this purpose SME in Western and East-
ern Germany are compared because these regions are very different
in their supply of public R&D funding. It turns out that Western
German SME are financially constrained in their R&D activities by
both internal and external resources. In Eastern Germany, firms are
not sensitive to external constraints, possibly due to high public R&D
subsidies. The results suggest that R&D in Eastern Germany is to a
large extent driven by public subsidies since the German re–unification
in 1990 and that the usual financial market mechanisms are repealed
with respect to R&D in this region.
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1 Introduction
Different theoretical arguments point out that investment in research and
development (R&D) activities is different from investment in capital goods
and underinvestment in R&D may occur. Since Nelson (1959) and Arrow
(1962), it is known that with respect to R&D market failures occur. On one
hand, innovations are expected to generate positive external effects, but
firms can only appropriate private returns and therefore will only launch
privately profitable innovation projects. As there may be projects that
would have positive benefits to society, but do not cover the private cost,
firms are reluctant to invest and the quantity of innovations is below the
socially desirable level. Another reason which increases the likelihood of
underinvestment is also described by Arrow (1962) and is due to information
asymmetries: When the innovation investor and financier are different, an
additional gap exists between the private rate of return and the cost of cap-
ital. Often there is a (large) difference between the rate of return required
by a firm investing its own funds and the required rate by external investors.
Hall (2002) surveys the literature on this topic and reviews several studies
from different countries.2 The asymmetric information problem refers to
the following fact: The inventor usually has a better information on the
innovation project, e.g. on the likelihood of success. In this case, financing
for R&D fits in Akerlof’s (1970) famous ‘market for lemons’ framework. The
investors have difficulties to distinguish good projects from ‘lemons’ and do
therefore charge a lemons’ premium for R&D which will be higher than that
for capital investment.3 In this context, an additional reason for financial
constraints, especially in small and medium–sized enterprises (SME) is sunk
costs: Banks and other debt–holders prefer to use physical assets to secure
loans and are reluctant to lend when the project involves substantial R&D
investment. Assets whose value in an alternative use is almost as high as
in their current use are more suited to the governance structures associated
with debt. Alderson and Betker (1996) find that liquidation costs and
R&D are positively correlated across firms. The entry barrier of sunk
costs can be expected to represent a bigger problem the smaller the firms are.
As a result, those arguments justify governmental interventions in the
market for R&D. While the positive external effects are usually considered
2See this survey for a lot of further of references on the topic. The present study is
not intended to provide a comprehensive discussion on the existing literature dealing with
financial constraints but focuses on the empirical analysis.
3See Hall (2002) for further arguments on market failures for R&D financing.
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when public funding for basic research, state–of–the–art technologies
or possible future key technologies, is the topic of interest, the second
argument on the wedge between internal and external cost of capital is
used as a rationale for supporting activities of SME. Especially SME may
be completely deterred from undertaking R&D projects because internal
funds are often scarce, and capital from private investors external to the
firm is expensive when the investment, like risky R&D projects, is difficult
to collaterize. Public R&D subsidies represent a cheap external resource for
the financing of R&D and an opportunity to reduce sunk costs and there-
fore enhance the probability of an implementation of R&D activities in SME.
This paper presents an empirical analysis which investigates whether finan-
cial constraints are present in SME and whether public R&D subsidies are
able to alleviate these constraints in a sample of firms from the German
manufacturing sector. In comparison to existing studies on Germany, there
are basically three new features in this paper:
• It focuses on SME while other authors have used samples of large
firms.
• Previous studies are conditional on R&D–performing firms and neglect
the circumstance that a large share of smaller firms do not conduct
any R&D activities due to the lack of financial resources. In this case,
non–R&D–performing firms, and the endogeneity of their decision, are
explicitly taken into account.
• Special attention is paid to a comparison of Eastern and Western Ger-
many, and to the public R&D funding already provided by government
in both regions. In Eastern Germany, R&D activities are extensively
subsidized in order to accelerate the transformation process from a
planned economy to a market economy. It is questionable whether
these governmental actions alleviate financial constraints significantly.
The following section describes some background on financial constraints
for R&D. Existing empirical studies for Germany which test for financial
constraints are taken into account for the subsequent empirical analysis.
The third section describes the special situation in Germany with respect
to R&D subsidies: on one hand, the western part, as industrialized and
well developed region since the mid of the last century, and, on the other
hand, the eastern regions which can be seen as transition economy since the
German re–unification in 1990. A comparison of both situations motivates
the following econometric section. The empirical approach is outlined below
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and after a description of the data, the estimation results are discussed. The
conclusion summarizes the empirical findings and suggests further research.
2 Brief review of the literature
R&D activities may be regarded as investment into a firm’s knowledge
capital and therefore insights from studies on physical investment are
important. In several studies, estimations of R&D investment equations
are compared with investment in physical assets. Investment in intangible
assets like R&D tends to be both more risky and harder to collaterize than
investment in physical assets. Therefore, it is more likely that financial
constraints for R&D occur. As most of the literature is already reviewed
in Hall (2002), I mainly refer to three existing studies using German data
(Harhoff, 1998; Bond et al., 1999; and Haid/Weigand, 2001), in order to
describe which kind of empirical work on financial constraints for R&D has
already been conducted for Germany and to explain what is new in this
study.4 The main results of Hall’s survey can be summarized as follows:
small and start–up firms in R&D–intensive industries face a higher cost
of capital than larger firms. In contrast, the financing gap for large firms
is harder to establish, but it seems clear that these firms prefer internally
generated funds for R&D investment. Moreover, Hall states that public
policies for R&D funding deserve further study. For those reasons, this
study focuses on SME and takes the public funding explicitly into account.
Since the study of Fazzari et. al (1988), econometric studies use to test for
financial contraints by investigating two (or more) different regimes of the
economy: On one hand, a regime of unconstrained firms is defined. These
are expected to be able to raise funds for any investment and therefore
the spending should not be sensitive to the availability of internal funds,
e.g. shocks in cash flow. On the other hand, the potentially constrained
firms should exhibit a significant relationship between investment and the
availability of financial resources.5 In the context of R&D and the literature
4Only the most recent paper of Haid and Weigand (2001) is not included in Hall’s
survey.
5This approach has been critized by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) who doubt that
investment–cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints. How-
ever, Fazzari et al. (2000) reply that the Kaplan–Zingales operational definition of the
absence of financing constraints and their empirical approach are inappropriate. Kaplan
and Zingales (2000) disagree with the comment of Fazzari et al. and in conclusion several
questions about both approaches remain unsolved. This paper paper as most other studies
follows Fazzari et al.
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on Germany, the regimes are classified by firm size, where constraints
would be expected for smaller firms, by countries (Germany and the UK)
and by governance structures (owner–controlled versus manager–controlled):
Harhoff (1998) compares R&D and investment in physical assets of German
manufacturing firms. He considers three different models: an accelerator
model, an error correction model and Euler equations (see Harhoff, 1998,
for a description of these models). The sample is split at the median of firm
size measured by sales (in the initial year). A combination of econometric
results for the three models applied and additional evidence from survey
data yields the following conclusions: Harhoff finds weak effects of cash
flow on R&D for small and large firms and positive cash flow effects on
investment in physical assets for small firms. The survey evidence suggests
that small firms have a higher probability of being constrained, ceteris
paribus.
Bond et al. (1999) also compare R&D and investment but consider two
countries: Britain and Germany. The British financial system is seen
to be less conducive to long–term investment than the German system,
due to different circumstances. One reason, among others, is a more
concentrated share ownership in Germany which may mitigate asymmetric
information and conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.
In Germany, banks are often present in large firms’ supervisory boards,
and thus asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders is reduced
(see Bond et al., 1999, for further information). Bond et al. mention that
a few previous studies suggest that company R&D spending is sensitive
to cash flow, but the results are often weak. They attribute this result to
two key features of R&D investment: establishing a R&D program involves
significant sunk costs, and large fluctuations in the level of spending in
existing research activities are very costly because a lot of R&D spending
is wages of R&D staff. As these are usually high–skilled workers, large
hiring, firing and training costs are incurred. For these reasons, “financial
constraints may manifest themselves more in the decision to set up R&D
facilities, rather than in decisions about the year to year levels of spending
in existing research programmes.” (Bond et al., 1999, p. 3) Therefore,
the R&D participation decision is separately taken into account by a
cross–sectional Probit estimation. Moreover, the relationship between fixed
investment and cash flow is investigated for R&D performing and non–R&D
performing firms. The results of their empirical analysis can be summarized
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easily: In Germany, cash flow is not informative at all. In Britain, cash
flow influences investment in physical assets but not R&D. However, R&D
participation is significantly correlated with cash flow in Britain but not
in Germany. Additionally, for the UK the ratio of debt to capital has a
significantly negative coefficient. Therefore, Bond et al. conclude that UK
firms are more likely to be affected by financing constraints. “UK firms
face a higher wedge between the costs of external and internal finance than
German firms. Thus they are more cautious about undertaking long–term
commitments to R&D projects [...] and those British firms that choose to
do R&D are a self–selected sample with ‘deep pockets’, for whom financial
constraints are less likely to be binding.” (Bond et al., 1999, p. 36)
Haid and Weigand (2001) also compare R&D and investment. They bring
arguments from innovation studies and from the literature on corporate
finance and governance together: They take different governance structures
into account and split their sample into a manager–controlled and an
owner–controlled regime. Splitting by size into large and smaller firms
is also considered. Haid and Weigand distinguish internal and external
funding constraints. As measures of external financing, a ratio of debt to
total liabilities and the change of bank loans to total liabilities are used.
They use a panel of 106 large and medium–sized German firms, which
reported R&D investment from 1987 to 1993. In contrast to Bond et al.,
Haid and Weigand identify constraints for R&D and investment by both
internal and external funds: Owner–controlled firms are constrained in both
R&D and investment in physical assets by the availability of internal and
external funding. However, no such constraints occur in manager–controlled
firms.
There are two studies using German data which are worth noting in this
context, although R&D is not considered but only investment in physical
assets: Audretsch and Elston (2001) analyze the role of firm size in more
detail. The sample is split in four different size classes where the smallest
group refers to firms with 500 or less employees. This study uses a more
representative sample of the German economy than the three studies cited
above, because there only very large firms were considered. However, the
mean in the smallest group is still 310 employees which is much larger than
most firms in the economy. Audretsch and Elston find that medium–sized
firms, defined as firms with a number of employees between 500 and 5500,
are more constrained than smaller and larger companies.
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Janz (1997) uses Euler equation models to analyze the investment behavior
of large German companies. He does not explicitly test for financial
constraints but studies investment behavior and investigates why the
Euler equation approach often fails to explain firm behavior. Janz uses
an interesting econometric technique: Instead of splitting the sample into
different firm groups a–priori, he applies a robust generalized method
of moments (GMM) for panel data to detect ‘outliers’: If firms act in
heterogeneous markets and face other competitive pressure, or suffer from
financial constraints, for example, they possibly behave differently from
others. Therefore, Janz applies a robust GMM estimator which allows
to detect outliers, i.e. some firms that engage in markets with perfect
competition and others with monopolistic structures, in his case. He
concludes that the neoclassical paradigm is suitable for explaining the
behavior of the mass of firms but the firms are too heterogeneous to be
described by a single model. As reasons for the failure of such investment
models are unknown a–priori, robust GMM allows to identify these on
the basis of the data. For example, Janz (1997) shows that outliers
turn out to represent changes of firms’ location or takeovers. Although
this methodology cannot be applied in this paper due to data limitations,
it could be a useful approach to study financial constraints in the future, too.
The new features of this study are the comparison of Eastern and Western
Germany. This is motivated in the following section. Moreover, this study
focuses exclusively on SME, i.e. only firms with at most 500 employees are
considered. This is new for Germany because all other studies on R&D
in this context have used samples of large firms (even if the sample are
sometimes split into ‘smaller’ and ‘larger’ firms): The mean of the number of
employees in former studies on R&D and financial constraints in Germany is
15,006 in Harhoff (1998), 16,538 in Bond et al. (1999) and 25,545 in Haid and
Weigand (2001). These large firms may not be the best candidates for studies
on financial constraints. The huge size of the firms considered could be an
explanation for the weak, or heterogenous, results on cash flow sensitivity
which are used to identify ficancial constraints. Finally, in this study the
non–R&D–performing firms are taken explicitly into account because, as
Harhoff (1998) and Bond et al. (1999) already point out, one hypothesis
is that smaller firms are often completely deterred from any R&D activity
instead of just spending less but positive amounts on R&D.
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3 R&D in Eastern and Western Germany in the
1990s
In Germany, many public R&D policies focus on the five states (“La¨nder”)
of the former German Democratic Republic. The aim is to foster innovation
activities in Eastern Germany. Innovations are expected to increase
productivity growth in these underdeveloped parts of the country. Since
the German re–unification in 1990, the vast majority of firms in Eastern
Germany has been newly founded. Therefore they are smaller than Western
German firms on average, and a large share of those is struggling to survive.
In the 1990s, the still underdeveloped infrastructure and, additionally, the
breakdown of the eastern European markets possibly have hampered a
positive development of Eastern Germany. The lack of large manufacturing
plants is often believed to cause a poor economic performance of this area.
The federal government has tried to compensate for these disadvantages
by offering specific R&D subsidies for Eastern German firms: first, all
public R&D programmes have been opened for Eastern German applicants
after the re–unification, and firms from the five new states received a
preferential treatment. Second, special R&D policy schemes have been
launched exclusively for Eastern Germany and, third, a special venture
capital program has been designed. Those components of federal R&D
policy were supplemented by additional programs initiated by the states.
Table 1 shows the total innovation expenditure in both regions: while
Western Germany contributes 52 Billion Euro in 1998, Eastern Germany
spends about 4 Billion. As Eastern Germany is much smaller than the
western part, a comparison at the firm level is necessary: It turns out
that the ‘average Eastern German manufacturer’ spends less on innovation
compared to the Western German average (about two thirds of the Western
German average). This result is, of course, partly due to a smaller average
firm size in Eastern Germany. In contrast, the share of R&D performing
firms is larger than in Western Germany, as is the share of firms that receive
public funding for R&D. As Table 1 shows, 41% of all Eastern German
firms are performing own internal R&D activities in 1998 while in Western
Germany only 31% do so. With respect to public funding of R&D, this
relation is not surprising: One third of all Eastern firms receive funding
for R&D activities from public resources, while only 8% are recipients in
Western Germany in 1998 (see Table 1).
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Table 1:
Innovation expenditure, R&D–performing firms and public
R&D funding in German manufacturinga
1994 1996 1998
Innovation expenditure in Billion Eurob
Western Germany 42.7 47.0 51.8
Eastern Germany 3.7 2.4 3.9
Average innovation expenditure per firm in Thousand Eurob
Western Germany 699 861 956
Eastern Germany 439 307 635
Share of R&D–performing firms (in %)
Western Germany 28 39 31
Eastern Germany 39 48 41
Share of firms receiving public R&D funding (in %)
Western Germany 7 6 8
Eastern Germany 27 34 33
a Shares adjusted by sampling weights; “R&D–performing” refers to firms
conducting own internal R&D projects.
b “Innovation expenditure” is defined according to the
OSLO–Manual (Eurostat/OECD 1997)
Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel
The question arises how public funding of R&D activities affects the
usual market mechanisms at work. Are the financial constraints for
such activities significantly reduced? Perhaps the usual capital market
mechanisms are repealed with respect to R&D in Eastern Germany? This
makes a comparison of Eastern and Western Germany an interesting task:
It allows to investigate how public policies affect the level of investment
in R&D activities and how usual market mechanisms are influenced. The
description of the Eastern German situation shows that it is very important
to take public resources into account when financial constraints for R&D
are analyzed.
In addition, survey evidence suggests that it is important to take non–R&D
performing firms into account, too, especially in case of SME. Lacking fi-
nancial resources may impede any kind of R&D activity in SME rather than
reducing the level of R&D investment (see Table 2). In Eastern Germany,
more firms indicate financial constraints concerning R&D than in Western
Germany. From the group of firms with more than 500 employees, a larger
share reports financing difficulties in both Eastern and Western Germany.
This is not surprising because limited financial resources are endogenous
to R&D: firms that are innovating and doing research intensely will clearly
reach their limits more likely than companies that conduct less R&D activ-
ities (or only occasionally). However, it is interesting that a large part of
hampered firms does not conduct any R&D activities. Especially, in West-
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ern Germany 42% of small firms reporting the lack of financial resources
for innovation projects, are deterred from own R&D activities. This effect
is bigger for the small firms than for the larger ones in both Eastern and
Western Germany. The results in Table 2 point again to the importance
of public R&D subsidies in Eastern Germany: While more Eastern German
firms report the lacking of financial resources than those in the western part,
this result turns when current R&D activities are taken into account. More
Western German companies do not perform R&D if they face financial con-
straints. This emphasizes the role of public funding in Eastern Germany has
to be taken into account because it seems that public policy schemes could
crucially alleviate financing difficulties for SME.
Table 2:
The lack of financial resources as obstacle for innovation
(in 1998)a
Firms reporting a lack of financial resources for innovation (in %)
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Large firms 9 25
SME 6 13
Out of those:
Share of firms which did not conduct any R&D project (in %)
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Large firms 14 3
SME 42 28
a Shares adjusted by sampling weights; SME have 500 employees or less,
large firms have more than 500.
Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel
4 Empirical Study
R&D is modeled as a function of firms’ knowledge stocks, the internal and
external funding opportunities, public funding, and of other control vari-
ables:
R&D = f(knowledge stock, internal resources, external
resources, public R&D funding, firm size,
sectoral and time controls).
The interpretation of estimation results is in the spirit of Fazzari et al.
(1988): The sample is split in Eastern and Western German firms. If the
R&D expenditure of one group of firms is sensitive to a measure, e.g. to
external funding resources, while R&D of the other group is not, it is con-
cluded that constraints are present for the firms being sensitive to that
particular measure. For comparison, I additionally estimate an equation for
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the investment in physical assets
INV = f(capital stock, internal resources, external
resources, firm size, sectoral and time controls).
The following subsection describes the data used and how the considered
variables are operationalized. Subsequently, the estimation results are dis-
cussed.
4.1 Data and Empirical Considerations
The data used are taken from three different databases: the Mannheim
Innovation Panel (MIP), a database of Creditreform and another one of the
“Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt” (DPMA) which is the German patent
office.
Most information is from the MIP which is an annual German innovation
survey conducted since 1992 by the Centre for European Economic Re-
search (ZEW) on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and
Research (BMBF). This study uses three waves on manufacturing firms
from 1995, 1997 and 1999, i.e. the data refer to the years 1994, 1996 and
1998. These particular waves are selected because information on public
innovation funding is available. Additionally to the MIP, data reflecting the
availability of external financial resources, i.e. a credit rating index from
the Creditreform database, is used. Creditreform is the largest German
credit rating agency. Moreover, patent applications are extracted from the
database of the DPMA. Comprehensive information on patenting activity
in Germany is available since 1980. Firms included in the MIP are searched
in the DPMA database by text–fields of name and location of the applicant.
Different entities of all included firms back to 1992 are considered. For the
time before 1992, there is no information on different entities available,
which may yield a downward bias of counts in the years before 1992. In
the case of SME, and especially Eastern German firms, this bias should be
small, however, because the majority of those firms did not exist before 1992.
As the analysis focuses on small and medium–sized firms, i.e. the sample
is restricted to firms with 500 employees at most. A sample of 1,306
observations on Western German firms and of 672 observations on Eastern
German firms of the manufacturing sector can be used. Descriptive
statistics of all variables used are presented in Table 3.
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The recent empirical literature on financial constraints, typically uses a
GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) for dynamic panel
data models and its extensions, e.g. Arellano and Bover (1995) or Blundell
and Bond (1998). This is not possible in this study for two reasons: On
one hand, the term ‘innovation panel’ is misleading. Most of the firms are
only observed once (see Table 9 in the appendix B) and thus the available
information is only cross–sectional. It is not possible to apply the kind of
dynamic models used in the recent literature. On the other hand, these
dynamic panel data models cannot be used for limited dependent variables,
which is the case in this study. For these two reasons, only cross–sectional
estimations of censored regression models with pooled data are carried out.
However, the empirical specification is related as close as possible to the
other studies. Lagged explanatory variables, if available, are considered to
avoid endogeneity.
The dependent variable is the log of R&D expenditure at the firm level,
ln(R&Dit).6 The share of firms with positive R&D expenditure is about
50% in both regions.7 R&D expenditures are deflated by a weighted price
index of producer goods, wages and investment goods. The weights take
into account the industry–specific R&D composition of material cost,
staff cost and investment (Source: Wissenschaftsstatistik, 1999). For
comparison, the gross investment into capital, ln(INVt), is also considered.
INVt is deflated by the price index for investment goods.
The lagged amount of physical assets ln(At−1) is used to control for size
effects. The squared value, (ln(At−1))2, is included to allow for a possible
non–(log)linear relationship. The lag is obtained by the perpetual inventory
method At = (1− δj)At−1 + INVt. It follows that
At−1 = (1− δj)−1(At − INVt).
At and INVt is available in the sample and δj is the industry–specific rate
of depreciation. This is calculated from the full sample of the MIP, where
currently nine waves are available, and enough repeated observations of firms
are included to calculate at least industry–specific depreciation rates. At is
deflated by the price index for investment goods.
6For convenience, I drop the index i in the following. All variables are at the firm level.
7Note that the figures in Table 1 refer to firms which conduct own internal R&D
projects but the R&D expenditure in this sample also includes research external to the
firm (e.g. contracted out). Therefore the share of firms with positive R&D expenditure
is larger in the sample used. Moreover, the statistics in Table 1 are population weighted
while the description of the sample is not.
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Table 3:
Descriptive statisticsa
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Western Germany
Employeest 142.342 128.075 2 500
R&Dt .256 .658 0 8.050
INVt .862 1.507 0 21.664
At−1 6.059 9.887 .008 111.074
PSt−1 3.211 13.924 0 237.539
MPt−1 .581 .494 0 1
CRt−1 202.191 55.809 110 600
PCMt .276 .139 .002 .798
PFt .120 .325 0 1
Eastern Germany
Employeest 92.152 92.475 2 460
R&Dt .155 .442 0 5.889
INVt .767 1.636 0 17.931
At−1 4.969 8.995 .009 91.848
PSt−1 1.368 6.118 0 88.165
MPt−1 .741 .438 0 1
CRt−1 243.390 54.564 135 600
PCMt .258 .150 .002 .813
PFt .408 .492 0 1
a Observations: 1,306 in Western Germany and
672 in Eastern Germany.
As control variable for the size of knowledge capital, the R&D stock is usually
constructed from a time series of R&D expenditures. However, this is not
possible in this paper due to the cross–sectional structure of the innovation
data. Therefore, the stock of patents (PSt) is considered as knowledge stock
(cf. OECD, 1994, for a comprehensive discussion on the use of patents as
science and technology indicators). On one hand, the R&D stock is a more
general measure of knowledge and it is known that patent counts underes-
timate the innovation potential of firms because not every research result
is patented due to limitations in patentability of new knowledge and firms’
preference for secrecy and lead time advantage as protection for intellectual
property (see e.g. for the United States: Levin et al., 1987, Cohen et al.,
2000; or for Germany: Ko¨nig and Licht, 1995). On the other hand, R&D
may be a noisy measure of innovation potential because not every research
activity must be successful and lead to usable results for the firm. If patents
are considered as a measure for the knowledge stock, one issue should be
clarified: One could choose either patent applications or patents granted. In
Germany, the number of patent applications in 1999 (2001) are, for example,
61,283 (64,151) but the granted patents are only 15,008 (14,707) (Source:
German Patent Office, 2000, 2001). Therefore, using only patent grants as
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a measure of knowledge stocks would cause a severe downward bias. More-
over, patent applications will be closer to the time of original knowledge
production, but the time lag between patent applications and grants may
be large. Therefore, I prefer to use the stock of patent applications instead
of patents granted because it indicates a stock of useful research results, at
least from the particular firm’s point of view. Even if a number of filed
patents are not granted, the technological knowledge behind them could be
used for the development of innovative processes and products. The merg-
ing of the DPMA database with the MIP provides a series of the number of
patent applications per year for the firms included in the sample since 1980.
The stock of applications is calculated by the perpetual inventory method
as
PSt = (1− δ)PSt−1 + PAt.
PAt is the number of patent applications in period t and δ is the annual
depreciation of knowledge capital which is set to 0.15 (see also Hall,
1990). As the patent series is available since 1980 and the sample under
consideration begins in 1994, the starting value PS1980 is set to zero for
all firms. The bias possibly emerging from this assumptions vanishes over
the years due to depreciation and should be negligible in the 1990’s.8. Of
course, not every firm has filed a patent: 42% (26%) of Western (Eastern)
German firms in the sample have a patent stock larger than zero. The
average patent stock of firms with at least one application in the period
under review is 7.6 (5.1) in Western (Eastern) Germany. The patent stocks
in Eastern Germany are obviously smaller because most firms did not
exist until the German re–unification in 1990. The patent stock enters
the regressions as the lagged ratio to assets, ln(PSt−1/At−1), to avoid
collinearity due to firm size. As this variable is in logs, the non–patenting
firms would have missing values in logarithmic specification. Therefore,
these missings are set to the minimum of non–missing values in the data.
A dummy variable MPt−1 indicates if a firm is not patenting and captures
the resulting bias of the transformation of the stock variable.
The financing hierarchy suggests that firms prefer to use internal financial
resources first. The internal finance portion is cash flow (with constant
marginal cost). When internal finance is exhausted, firms turn to debt
finance which may be more costly when capital markets are imperfect. (See
8If a patent has been filed jointly by two or more applicants, the application is counted
for both of them because the knowledge behind the patent should be available to each of
the applicants.
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Fazzari et al., 2000). There are several arguments why debt finance is subject
to increasing marginal cost (see Carpenter and Petersen, 2002): First, the
probability of financial distress rises with the degree of leverage. Second,
moral hazard increases with leverage. Third, especially small firms whose
assets are firm specific or intangible to a large fraction, e.g. in high–tech
industries, face high costs for debt finance, because the value of knowledge
capital as collateral is limited. Both resources, internal and external, are
taken into account. However, it is not possible to calculate cash flow with
the data available. The firms in the sample are SME and almost all are
unquoted and are not obliged to publish account data. Such information as
given in balance sheets is not surveyed in the MIP. However, as proxy for
internal funds available, a kind of price–cost margin can be calculated as
PCMt =
salest − staff costt −material costt
salest
.
This formula goes back to Ravenscraft (1983). Unfortunately, this variable
cannot be lagged due to the cross–sectional structure of the innovation
survey. In other studies, the R&D expenditures are sometimes added back
to cash flow because R&D is an expense (see e.g. Harhoff, 1998). However,
R&D is not completely an expense: according to the Wissenschaftsstatistik
(1999), which is the largest German survey on R&D activities, about
62% of R&D expenditures in the manufacturing sector are wages, 31%
are material costs and 7% are investment. Therefore, only the wages
and the material costs are added back to PCM . The information of the
Wissenschaftsstatistik is used on a two digit industry level, where the share
of investment within R&D ranges from 1.5% to 27.2%. Sales are deflated
by an industry–specific price index of producer goods, staff cost by the
price index of wages in manufacturing and material cost by the price index
of producer goods.
The measure reflecting external financing constraints is a lagged credit–
rating index (CRt−1). Firms which have bad credit ratings will clearly
have higher costs for raising external capital than others. Moreover, such
firms will need a collateral to obtain additional external funds, at all. If
external financing contraints are present, the estimated coefficient should
be significantly different from zero. The credit rating index ranges from
100 to 600 where 100 represents the best rating and 600 the worst. Thus,
the expected sign is negative, i.e. the better the rating, the more able
is a firm to acquire (cheap) external funds and the more R&D it will perform.
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As already discussed, the most important variable for the comparison of
Eastern and Western Germany is the receipt of public subsidies for R&D. A
dummy variable indicates whether a firm has received public funding (PFt).
Public innovation programs offer a reduction of possible financial con-
straints, and are expected to enlarge the innovative activities in the economy.
4.2 Estimation Results
OLS regressions are carried out for the firms with positive R&D expenditure
(column I in the regression tables). As non–R&D–performing firms are
also taken into account in this study, the application of censored regression
models is necessary. Therefore, Tobit models are estimated (col. II in
following tables; see the appendix A for a description of the estimated
models). First, the assumption of homoscedasticity is maintained. As
heteroscedasticity in the Tobit model implies not only biased standard
errors but also inconsistent estimates of the coefficients, tests of het-
eroscedasticity are essential. Lagrange multiplier tests on (group–wise)
multiplicative heteroscedasticity are performed with industry dummies,
size dummies and time dummies (see Greene 2000, p. 913–914). As the
assumption of homoscedasticity is rejected in all regressions, heteroscedastic
models are estimated, where the variance is modeled as function of the 13
industry dummies, five size dummies and two time dummies (col. III in
the regression tables). As the coefficients of the Tobit model do not allow
for a direct interpretation, marginal effects of the explanatory variables
on the observed dependent variable (col. IV) are computed at the sample
means on basis of the heteroscedastic Tobit model (see appendix A.1 for
the formula).
Table 4 displays the estimation results on R&D expenditures of Western
German SME. Firm size has the expected positive effect on R&D expendi-
tures. The marginal effect (col. IV) shows that the effect of size is larger
when all firms are considered rather than only R&D–performing firms (col.
I). This is also supported by the measure of knowledge capital: firms with
a larger ratio of patent applications to physical assets are spending more
on R&D activities.
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Table 4:
Western Germany: Estimation of R&D equationa
Dependent variable: ln (R&Dt)
I II III IV
OLSb Homoscedastic Heteroscedastic Marginal
Tobit Tobit c Effectsd
ln (At−1) .651∗∗∗ 1.827∗∗∗ 1.708∗∗∗ 1.017
(.053) (.207) (.191)
(ln (At−1))
2 -.003 -.103∗ -.076 -.045
(.017) (.056) (.054)
ln (PSt−1/At−1) .237∗∗∗ .849∗∗∗ .752∗∗∗ .448
(.042) (.163) (.146)
MPt−1 .442∗∗ -.314 -.723 -.431
(.197) (.709) (.667)
ln (PCMt) .254∗∗∗ 1.385∗∗∗ 1.270∗∗∗ .756
(.088) (.285) (.274)
ln (CRt−1) -.394∗ -1.723∗∗ -1.973∗∗ -1.175
(.215) (.800) (.775)
PFt .382∗∗∗ 4.592∗∗∗ 3.948∗∗∗ 2.351
(.122) (.512) (.473)
Constant term -.505 .548 -.788
(1.215) (4.393) (4.624)
log–likelihood — -2,525.36 -2,497.05
R2 0.4279 — —
nobs 672 1,306 1,306
a Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗(∗∗;∗ ) report a 1% (5; 10%) level of significance;
all estimations include 13 industry dummies and 2 time dummies.
b Only R&D performing firms. Standard errors are heteroscedastic–consistent.
c Heteroscedasticity term includes industry dummies, time dummies and size dummies.
d Marginal effects are based on the heteroscedastic Tobit model and are calculated
at the sample means of the explanatory variables.
The internal resources measured by PCM are highly significant and firms
are sensitive to external funding constraints: firms with a bad credit
rating do less R&D, which leads to the conclusion that external capital
is an additional source for innovation activities in Western German SME.
Moreover, public funding is significantly positive at the 1% level in all
regressions. The difference between the subsample of R&D–performing
firms (col. I) and the full sample (col. IV) show that generally the effects
are underestimated when the R&D status is not taken into account.
The estimation for R&D expenditures in Eastern Germany shows interesting
differences. While Western German firms seem to be constrained by both
internal and external financing resources, no impact of the credit rating can
be identified for the Eastern ones. Moreover, the impact of PCM is smaller
in Eastern Germany. Besides firm size, only the public funding dummy is
significantly different from zero. The estimated coefficient and the marginal
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effect at the sample mean is roughly twice as high in Western Germany.
The Eastern German firms seem not to be financially constrained by exter-
nal resources, because the public policy schemes repeal the mechanisms of
financial markets. On one hand, this result is positive because the public
R&D programs seem to foster innovation. Firms which would possibly not
be able to conduct innovation activities due to the lack of internal and ex-
ternal financial opportunities are enabled to create their own technological
knowledge stock and may reach a critical mass of absorptive capacity for
future research projects. On the other hand, it is questionable if it should
be the government’s aim to wipe out market solutions. Perhaps a lot of
R&D performed in Eastern Germany does not lead to successful products
or processes.
Table 5:
Eastern Germany: Estimation of R&D equationa
Dependent variable: ln (R&Dt)
I II III IV
OLSb Homoscedastic Heteroscedastic Marginal
Tobit Tobit c Effectsd
ln (At−1) .717∗∗∗ .735∗∗ .843∗∗∗ .512
(.130) (.324) (.276)
(ln (At−1))
2 -.017 -.087 -.073 -.044
(.031) (.071) (.070)
ln (PSt−1/At−1) .190∗ -.200 -.052 -.032
(.112) (.280) (.236)
MPt−1 .266 -1.856 -1.080 -.656
(.419) (1.174) (.993)
ln (PCMt) -.184∗ .288 .447∗∗ .272
(.101) (.253) (.226)
ln (CRt−1) .253 -.008 -.014 -.008
(.328) (1.060) (.859)
PFt .524∗∗∗ 8.067∗∗∗ 8.174∗∗∗ 4.968
(.196) (.445) (.416)
Constant term -5.656∗∗∗ -10.657∗ -11.290∗∗
(1.876) (5.929) (4.853)
log–likelihood — -1,135.69 -1,106.63
R2 0.3640 — —
nobs 336 672 672
a Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗(∗∗;∗ ) report a 1% (5; 10%) level of significance;
all estimations include 13 industry dummies and 2 time dummies.
b Only R&D performing firms. Standard errors are heteroscedastic–consistent.
c Heteroscedasticity term includes industry dummies, time dummies and size dummies.
d Marginal effects are based on the heteroscedastic Tobit model and are evaluated
at the sample means of the explanatory variables.
The results of the regressions are fairly stable over subsamples. Tables 6
and 7 present results of analogous estimations for firms with less than 200
employees. The effects of financial factors remain significantly different from
17
zero and the marginal effects are similar, when smaller firms in Western Ger-
many are considered (Table 6). The public funding is also important for the
smaller firms which is in line with the hypothesis that public policy schemes
are an important stimulus for the R&D status of small firms. Participating
in a public policy scheme may serve as some kind of certification: In case
of this ‘governmental approval’ of the research carried out in the firm, the
gap due to asymmetric information between the external investors and the
firm is perhaps reduced and additional external financing resources become
available.
Table 6:
Western Germany: Estimation of R&D equationa
— Firms with less than 200 employees —
Dependent variable: ln (R&Dt)
I II III IV
OLSb Homoscedastic Heteroscedastic Marginal
Tobit Tobit c Effectsd
ln (At−1) .477∗∗∗ 1.261∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗ .515
(.066) (.311) (.295)
(ln (At−1))
2 .024 -.250∗∗∗ -.240∗∗∗ -.111
(.024) (.087) (.084)
ln (PSt−1/At−1) .127∗∗ .556∗∗ .526∗∗ .244
(.061) (.265) (.253)
MPt−1 .072 -1.442 -1.427 -.662
(.230) (1.010) (1.103)
ln (PCMt) .266∗∗ 1.478∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗∗ .722
(.117) (.391) (.386)
ln (CRt−1) -.383 -2.499∗∗ -3.155∗∗∗ -1.464
(.313) (1.165) (1.177)
PFt .290∗ 5.586∗∗∗ 5.013∗∗∗ 2.327
(.174) (.720) (.687)
Constant term -1.411 3.900 -4.677
(1.802) (6.355) (7.080)
log–likelihood — -1,582.76 -1,566.71
R2 0.3688 — —
nobs 400 913 913
a Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗(∗∗;∗ ) report a 1% (5; 10%) level of significance;
all estimations include 13 industry dummies and 2 time dummies.
b Only R&D performing firms. Standard errors are heteroscedastic–consistent.
c Heteroscedasticity term includes industry dummies, time dummies and size dummies.
d Marginal effects are based on the heteroscedastic Tobit model and are evaluated
at the sample means of the explanatory variables.
In Eastern Germany, the results are also similar between the full sample and
the sample of small firms. The public funding dummy and PCM are signif-
icantly different from zero while CR is not. This points to the hypothesis
that possibly too much public funding is offered in Eastern Germany, be-
cause no financial constraints for R&D due to the lack of external resources
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can be found.
Table 7:
Eastern Germany: Estimation of R&D equationa
— Firms with less than 200 employees —
Dependent variable: ln (R&Dt)
I II III IV
OLSb Homoscedastic Heteroscedastic Marginal
Tobit Tobit c Effects d
ln (At−1) .472∗∗∗ .290 .572∗ .313
(.156) (.369) (.315)
(ln (At−1))
2 -.004 -.045 -.011 -.006
(.035) (.091) (.089)
ln (PSt−1/At−1) -.001 -.541 -.184 -.101
(.142) (.327) (.283)
MPt−1 -.398 -3.106 -1.618 -.884
(.499) (1.335) (1.125)
ln (PCMt) -.011 .626∗∗ .730∗∗∗ .399
(.097) (.287) (.255)
ln (CRt−1) -.021 .282 -.063 -.034
(.362) (1.185) (.913)
PFt .521∗∗ 8.186∗∗∗ 8.430∗∗∗ 4.605
(.221) (.499) (.453)
Constant term -3.867∗ -11.521∗ -10.777∗∗∗
(2.069) (6.610) (5.175)
log–likelihood — -922.76 -896.466
R2 0.3374 — —
nobs 269 582 582
a Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗(∗∗;∗ ) report a 1% (5; 10%) level of significance;
all estimations include 13 industry dummies and 2 time dummies.
b Only R&D performing firms. Standard errors are heteroscedastic–consistent.
c Heteroscedasticity term includes industry dummies, time dummies and size dummies.
d Marginal effects are based on the heteroscedastic Tobit model and are evaluated
at the sample means of the explanatory variables.
In Table 8 the results of estimations on the determinants of investment are
displayed. These regressions are analogous to the R&D equation, but the
measures of innovation are not meaningful (knowledge stock and the dummy
on public R&D funding) and therefore left out. In Western Germany, the
results are similar to the R&D equation. Firm size has a strong positive
effect. Moreover, investment is sensitive to resources of internal and external
funding. Those firms with low cash flow or a bad credit rating invest less
than others. In Eastern Germany, the regressions are not very informative.
Besides size, only the credit rating is weakly significant in the regression.
One reason may be the absence of a dummy variable which captures public
subsidies for investment in physical assets. Subsidies of such kind are also
present in Germany, but are not as extensive as R&D subsidies (in relation
to overall investment and R&D expenditure).
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Table 8:
Estimation of investment equationsa
Dependent variable: ln (INVt)
I II III IV
OLSb Homoscedastic Heteroscedastic Marginal
Tobit Tobit c Effects d
Western Germany
ln (At−1) .711∗∗∗ .952∗∗∗ .889∗∗∗ .889
(.022) (.041) (.053)
(ln (At−1))
2 .004 -.026 -.066∗∗∗ -.066
(.009) (.017) (.017)
ln (PCMt) .065 .194∗∗ .151∗∗∗ .151
(.047) (.087) (.067)
ln (CRt−1) -.703∗∗∗ -1.041∗∗∗ -.600∗∗∗ -.600
(.154) (.268) (.192)
Constant term 2.000∗∗ 3.502∗∗ 1.909∗
(.837) (1.461) (1.053)
log–likelihood — -2,791.54 -2,532.61
R2 0.5224 — —
nobs 1,245 1,306 1,306
Eastern Germany
ln (At−1) .739∗∗∗ .882∗∗∗ .795∗∗∗ .795
(.035) (.053) (.057)
(ln (At−1))
2 .016 -.002 -.015 -.015
(.014) (.023) (.021)
ln (PCMt) -.026 .017 -.002 -.002
(.074) (.097) (.080)
ln (CRt−1) -.716∗∗ -.930∗∗ -.707∗ -.707
(.325) (.418) (.369)
Constant term 2.324 3.281 2.457
(1.779) (2.314) (2.042)
log–likelihood — -1,391.76 -1,284.81
R2 0.4501 — —
nobs 652 672 672
a Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗(∗∗;∗ ) report a 1% (5; 10%) level of significance;
all estimations include 13 industry dummies and 2 time dummies.
b Only firms with positive investment. Standard errors are White–heteroscedastic
consistent.
c Heteroscedasticity term includes industry dummies, time dummies and size dummies.
d Marginal effects are based on the heteroscedastic Tobit model and are evaluated
at the sample means of the explanatory variables.
In appendix A.2, I present additional estimates of a simultaneous estimation
of the R&D and investment equation. A possible correlation of disturbances
among equations is exploited to gain efficiency. Although a significant cor-
relation of error terms is found, the results of the separate equations are
confirmed and the additional regressions are relegated to the appendix there-
fore.
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5 Conclusion
This paper presents an empirical investigation of possible financing con-
straints in SME in Germany. Both R&D expenditure and investment in
physical assets were considered. It turns out that Western Germany firms
are sensitive to both internal and external funding constraints. Another
important factor in explaining different levels of R&D expenditures are
public R&D subsidies. Publicly funded firms exhibit higher R&D ex-
penditures than other firms. In Eastern Germany, no external financial
constraints for R&D are present. The estimation results show that public
funding is the driving force for R&D in Eastern Germany. The financial
markets mechanisms are repealed by public R&D subsidies and do not
have a significant impact on the R&D activities of Eastern German firms.
The results are fairly stable over subsamples: The estimation of the R&D
equation for firms with less than 200 employees confirm the previous
conclusions. The results on investment are similar to R&D in Western
Germany. The firms are sensitive to internal and external financing
constraints. In Eastern Germany, the results are not very informative
but the coefficient of lacking external resources differs significantly from zero.
It is important to note that the inclusion of a measure of public subsidies
is essential if firms’ R&D expenditures are analyzed in Germany. How-
ever, the estimated coefficient is possibly too large due to problems of
sample selection: Firms with a higher propensity for innovation will select
themselves into the public programs. As the evaluation of the impacts
was not the central topic of this paper, the selection problem is not taken
into account here. The problem, “how much the subsidized firms would
have spent on R&D if they had not received public funding” is a classical
evaluation question. This has already been addressed by Czarnitzki (2001)
and Almus and Czarnitzki (2002) for Eastern Germany. Both studies find
that the public funding does not crowd–out the private investment in R&D.
Subsidies are positive stimulus for innovation activities in Eastern Germany.
However, one may question whether the high level of public R&D funding
leads to a corresponding innovation success in terms of market shares and
sales of new products in many of these publicly funded firms.
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Appendix A.1: The Tobit model
Let c be the censoring point (from below in this case), y∗i the dependent
variable of a latent model and yi the observed values. The formulation of
the regression model is
y∗i = β
′xi + εi, i = 1, . . . , N (1)
where
yi =
{
y∗i if y∗i > c,
c if y∗i ≤ c,
(2)
and y∗ ∼ N [µ, σ2]. β is the vector of parameters to be estimated, xi is the
set of regressors and εi denotes the error term. The log likelihood for this
censored regression model is
lnL =
∑
yi>c
−1
2
[
ln(2pi) + lnσ2 +
(yi − β′xi)2
σ2
]
(3)
+
∑
yi≤c
ln
[
Φ
(
c− β′xi
σ
)]
,
where Φ denotes the cumulative density function of the standard normal
distribution. If heteroscedasticity is present, the variance is modeled as
σ2i = σ
2 exp(α′wi), (4)
where α denotes the vector of parameters and wi is the set of explanatory
variables causing heteroscedasticity. In the heteroscedastic model, σ in the
log likelihood function above is simply replaced by σi.
Note that using logs of yi in estimations would cause missing values for the
censored observations if c ≤ 0 which is true in the case considered here.
Therefore, the censored observations are set to the minimum (observed)
value of ln y∗i . The same rule applies to c, of course. The only problem
arising from the transformation is that the estimate of the constant term in
xi is biased.
Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the explanatory
variables as (see e.g. Greene 2000, p. 909)
∂E(y¯i|x¯i)
∂x¯i
= βˆProb(y¯∗i > c) = βˆ
[
1− Φ
(
c− x¯iβˆ
σˆ
)]
. (5)
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Appendix A.2: Simultaneous estimation of two Tobit equa-
tions
Additionally to the estimations presented in section 4, a simultaneous esti-
mation of R&D and investment has been carried out. In this case, a possible
correlation among disturbances can be exploited to gain efficiency. Let y∗i1
and y∗i2 be the two dependent variables of the latent model. c1, c2 are the
corresponding censoring limits (from below) and yi1, yi2 are the observed
values. The econometric model is (Gourieroux, 2000, chapter 9, has a good
overview on systems of simultaneous equations with limited dependent vari-
ables, or see Maddala, 1983, chapter 7):
y∗1i = β
′
1x1i + ε1i, i = 1, . . . , N
y∗2i = β
′
2x2i + ε2i, i = 1, . . . , N (6)
where
y1i =
{
y∗1i if y∗1i > c1,
c1 if y∗1i ≤ c1,
y2i =
{
y∗2i if y∗2i > c2,
c2 if y∗2i ≤ c2.
(7)
Assuming that the dependent variables are jointly normally distributed,
(y∗1, y∗2) ∼ N2[µ1, σ21, µ2, σ22, ρ], leads to the likelihood function L which is
composed of four parts defined by the different parameter regimes. Let
ηk =
yki − β′kxki
σk
, with k = 1, 2,
and L1 be the first regime where both dependent variables are non–censored
(L1 : yk = y∗k, k = 1, 2). In this case, the likelihood is just the density of
the bivariate normal distribution:
L1 =
∏
y1 = y
∗
1
y2 = y
∗
2
(
2piσ1σ2
√
1− ρ2
)−1
exp
[
−0.5
(
η21 + η
2
2 − 2ρη1η2
)
1− ρ2
]
(8)
In the case where one variable is censored (y2 = c2) while the other is not
(y1 = y∗1), the contribution to the likelihood function is (see Gourieroux
2000, p. 227)
L2 =
∏
y1 = y
∗
1
y2 = c2
σ−11 φ (η1) Φ
(
c2 − β′2x2i + ρσ2σ1 (y1i − β′1x1i)
σ2
√
1− ρ2
)
, (9)
where φ denotes the density function of the standard normal distribution.
L3 is the corresponding case of y1 = c1 and y2 = y∗2.
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In the fourth regime both variables are censored (y1 = c1 and y2 = c2):
L4 =
∏
y1 = c1
y2 = c2
Φ2
(
c1 − β′1x1i
σ1
;
c2 − β′2x2i
σ2
; ρ
)
, (10)
where Φ2 is the cumulative density function of the bivariate standard normal.
Consequently, the likelihood function to be maximized is
L =
∏
y1 = y
∗
1
y2 = y
∗
2
L1
∏
y1 = y
∗
1
y2 = c2
L2
∏
y1 = c1
y2 = y
∗
2
L3
∏
y1 = c1
y2 = c2
L4 (11)
The estimation of this model is difficult in the case considered here, because
there are only few observations of y2 (the investment) which are censored.
Hence the optimization does not converge well. To estimate both equations
simultaneously, I have reduced the maximization problem: y2 is treated as a
continuous variable without censoring. This should not harm the results in
this case, but makes the simultaneous estimation of both equations possible.
The likelihood function then reduces to
L =
∏
y1 = y
∗
1
y2 = y
∗
2
L1
∏
y1 = c1
y2 = y
∗
2
L3 (12)
Instead of estimating ρ directly, a parameter λ is estimated to ensure that
the correlation is restricted to the interval (−1; 1): ρ = (2/pi) arctan(λ). The
estimation confirms the results of the single equation models presented in
the text.
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Table 9:
Simultaneous Estimation of R&D and investment equationsa
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Dependent variable:
ln (R&Dt) ln (INVt) ln (R&Dt) ln (INVt)
ln (At−1) 1.776∗∗∗ .916∗∗∗ .797∗∗ .858∗∗∗
(.202) (.038) (.316) (.050)
(ln (At−1))
2 -.088 -.008 -.077 .001
(.055) (.016) (.070) (.021)
ln (PSt−1/At−1) .691∗∗∗ — -.179 —
(.162) (.276)
MPt−1 -.731 — -1.706 —
(.684) (1.157)
ln (PCMt) 1.393∗∗∗ .195∗∗ .372 .026
(.281) (.085) (.252) (.092)
ln (CRt−1) -2.040∗∗∗ -1.007∗∗∗ -.356 -.862∗∗
(.775) (.251) (1.05) (.389)
PFt 4.116∗∗∗ — 7.917∗∗∗ —
(.520) (.444)
Constant term 1.901 2.733∗∗ -8.796 2.596
(4.253) (1.378) (5.860) (2.162)
λ [ρ]b .605∗∗∗ [.346] .424∗∗∗ [.255]
(.160) (.122)
log–likelihood -5,274.34 -2,505.49
nobs 1,306 672
a Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗(∗∗;∗ ) report a 1% (5; 10%) level of significance;
Both equations include 13 industry dummies and 2 time dummies.
b ρ = (2/pi) arctan(λ). This transformation is made to ensure that
the determinant of the covariance matrix is positive, i.e. 0 < ρ < 1.
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Appendix B: Panel structure
Most firms in the sample are only observed once: this concerns 77% of firms
in Western Germany and 69% in Eastern Germany. Therefore the data are
pooled and only cross–sectional estimators are applied in this study.
Table 10:
Panel structure
Western Germany
Observed pattern
1994 1996 1998 Frequency Percent Cumulative
X 310 30.2 30.2
X 294 28.7 58.9
X 185 18.1 77.0
X X 104 10.2 87.1
X X 60 5.9 93.0
X X X 45 4.4 97.4
X X 27 2.6 100.0
1025 100.0
Eastern Germany
Observed pattern
1994 1996 1998 Frequency Percent Cumulative
X 145 29.4 29.4
X 103 20.9 50.2
X 93 18.8 69.0
X X 56 11.3 80.4
X X 52 10.5 90.1
X X X 25 5.1 96.0
X X 20 4.1 100.0
494 100.0
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